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ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE AND
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR TICKET SCALPING
Stephen K. Happel*
Marianne M. Jennings**
INTRODUCTION
Hal (not his real name) is black, nondescript and [thirty-one years of age].
When I met him outside Yankee Stadium, he wore a torn Steelers T-shirt and
jeans. Hal is the quintessential exponent of free-market economics. Or, as the
legal system would have it, black-market economics. Throughout our conversation
he was on the lookout for police-uniformed and un-uniformed and undercover.
Hal enjoys his trade. He should: It's a sweet gig. I gave Hal $20. My seat was
excellent: behind third base, eight rows back. Indeed, I wouldn't have come
uptown at all had I not known that some scalper or other would serve me well.
I have a crazy schedule. I can't buy in advance. The man sitting beside me had
sold my ticket to Hal for $7.50 (a corporate box he couldn't use). He was happy.
I was happy. Hal, with a $12.50 profit, was happiest. This transaction, which
pleased everyone, had been illegal, of course. The law is an idiot. Again.'

You can find ticket scalpers like Hal at sporting events from Wimbledon 2 to
the Super Bowl. 3 You can find them at rock concerts 4 and you can even find
them at Broadway plays in Moscow or at the Bolshoi Ballet. 5
Associate Professor of Economics, College of Business, Arizona State University.
Professor of Finance, College of Business, Arizona State University.
1. Mano, Scalping, NAT'L REV., Aug. 28, 1987, at 37.
2.
At the 1988 Wimbledon championships, a pair of tickets to the men's finals brought $2000.
Wimbledon Umpires Double-Fault, NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1988, at 37. At the same time, many
"touts" (as scalpers are known in England) were handed a setback as traders were fined,
jailed, and had their tickets held until the championships were over. Wimbledon Perestroika,
307 ECONOMIST 61 (June 1988).
The interesting aspect about ticket allocation at Wimbledon is that tickets are initially
allocated for nominal sums to members of closed "privilegents." Those with little interest in
tennis are the ones who offer their tickets to the touts who then get them to the public. In
addition, the umpires at Wimbledon were discovered to be scalping their free one-half dozen
pairs of centre court tickets. The touts cried foul when the umpires demanded 800 quid a pair
for the tickets. NEWSWEEK, supra, at 37.
3.
Super Bowl tickets have undergone markups ranging from 200% to 900%. Super Bowl XV:
Football's Little Bighorn?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 26, 1981, at 31.
4.
For example, during rock singer Prince's 1985 "Purple Rain" tour, tickets originally sold for
between $15.50 and $17.50 each, but fans paid scalpers as much as $5000 for two front row
seats. Nager, America's Biggest Ticket Scalper, ROLLING STONE, May 9, 1985, at 9. More
recently, Houston's Ticketron service was deluged with calls from irate parents whose children
were paying $75 a piece for U-2 concert tickets with a face value of $17.50. Pankay, Scalpers
Skim the Boxoffice Cream, VAITY, February 4, 1987, at 161.
One scalper commented:
On a rock concert you make more money than anything else. Those kids, their parents
give them $200 and tell them to get out of here. Kids'll pay anything for a rock-concert
ticket. Kid'll say, "Let me go in the concert. When I come out you can kill me." They
say that.
Mano, supra note 1, at 37.
5.
The highest priced theater tickets originally sold in Moscow for $18, but the scalpers' price
was $40. Moscow Digs "Cats;" Scalpers Get Busy, VArETY, May 25, 1988, at 1.
*
**
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The omnipresence of ticket scalping indicates that, from an economic perspective, scalpers create various benefits. Yet, there are ongoing legal attempts to
restrict or even prohibit scalping activities, ostensibly to increase overall welfare.
In order to determine if restrictions or outright prohibition are appropriate, a
series of questions must be addressed. Why does scalping arise in the first place
and, in particular, what role do those promoting the events play in generating
scalping activities? Who benefits and who loses from scalping in an unregulated
environment? What about nuisance effects, illegal activities, and the use of
"diggers," individuals who simply stand in line to purchase large blocks of
tickets for resale by scalpers? What market-oriented approaches may be used by
promoters or team owners to deal with problems raised by scalping activities?
This article addresses these questions by drawing upon neoclassical microeconomic market theory as it relates to the current regulatory framework. Section I
begins by outlining statutory regulation at the state level in the United States,
after which judicial interpretation is reviewed. Section II examines the economic
motivation behind scalping and discusses the role of promoters in generating the
phenomenon. Section III, drawing upon the economic analysis, summarizes the
key problems surrounding existing regulation. Section IV then presents situations
under which scalping can be defended on efficiency grounds and considers how
long-run profit maximizers may go about trying to eliminate scalping if profits
are being reduced. The article concludes with some views about the future
direction of ticket scalping regulation in the United States.
I. CURRENT REGULATORY FORMATS FOR THE CONTROL OF
SCALPING
A.

Statutory Regulation
Currently, twenty-one states have some form of scalping regulation. 6 Some of
these states regulate only at particular types of public institutions. 7 Other states
restrict scalping only in certain events. 8 Some limit the location of the
6.

7.
8.

See ALA. CODE § 40-12-167 (1987); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 5-204 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 5-63-201 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 346 (West Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-289
(1981); FLA. STAT. § 817.36 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-310 (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
121, para. 157.32 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); GEN. LAWS OF KEN. ANN., KEN. PENAL CODE
§ 518.070 (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:1 (West 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 119
(1987); MAss. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 185D (West Supp. 1982); MICH. COMI'. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.465 (West 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 669.805 (West Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-344 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 to 56:8-35 (West 1983); N.Y. GEN Bus. LAW § 169C (McKinney Supp. 1981); 4 PA. CONS. STAT. 211 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-720 (Law.
Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4041 (1975); and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.50 (West 1966).
This list does not include the numerous county and city ordinances that also regulate
scalping. For example, South Dakota and Virginia have enabling provisions that permit local
governments to regulate scalping. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-29.3 (1981) and S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 9-34.8 (1981).
In Connecticut, scalping is prohibited only for events sponsored by educational institutions.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-289 (1981). In Wisconsin, scalping is prohibited only for events
of the University of Wisconsin. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.50 (West 1966).
Georgia and South Carolina provide the most generic approach, regulating scalping at all
"athletic events." See GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-310 (1981) and S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-720
(Law. Co-op. 1976). The Arizona and California statutes apply only to wrestling and boxing
events. See Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 5-204 (1974) and CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 18,710
(West 1964). However, Arizona has passed legislation proposed which would prohibits scalping
on state property. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3718 (1989).
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scalping, 9 while others restrict or define the maximum resale profit. 10 Some state
regulations are designed to prohibit scalping only if the issuer wishes to do so."
Other regulations attempt to control scalpers by requiring a license. 2 All of the
states with antiscalping regulation impose some form of criminal sanctions through
convictions or fines, 3 with the majority of states holding violations to be
misdemeanors. 14
B.

Judicial Review: Constitutional Validity of Scalping Regulations

Early judicial response to antiscalping provisions was negative, there being
some reluctance to enforce state laws prohibiting scalping on the grounds that
such activity was largely private and hence could not be justified as a legitimate
exercise of the public police powers. 5 The basic reasoning of the courts was that
amusement and entertainment did not affect public interest in the sense that
justified other forms of regulation, such as that of specific commercial transactions.' 6 Further, the early courts noted that resale of tickets for profit was not
different than resale of other merchandise 7 and that the "hazards of street
vending" argument could not be justified when other ambulatory vendors-such

9.
10.

California does not prohibit scalping for athletic and entertainment events except at the site
of the event. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 346 (West Supp. 1982).
Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota and Tennessee prohibit profits altogether.
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 157.32 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
4:1 (West 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 56 § 119 (1987); MICH. Coup. LAWS ANN. § 750.456
(West 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.805 (West Supp. 1982); and TENN. CODE ANN. § 394101 (1974).
Florida limits profits to one dollar per ticket. See FLA. STAT. § 817.36 (1981) and North
Carolina limits them to three dollars per ticket. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-344 (1981). New
York and Pennsylvania permit a profit of two dollars per ticket. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 169-C (McKinney Supp. 1981) and 4 PA. CONS. STAT. 211 (1981).
Massachusetts sets a generic limit of two dollars in excess of ticket face value unless the
reseller can establish additional service charges are warranted. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
140, § 185D (West Supp. 1982). North Carolina allows a "reasonable service fee." N.C. GEN.
STAT.

11.

§ 14-344 (1987).

For example, Kentucky's statute provides: "(1)

A person is guilty of ticket scalping when he

intentionally sells or offers to sell a ticket to an event at a price greater than that charged at
the place of admission or printed on the ticket, unless authorized by the issuer or by law."
GEN. LAWS OF KEN. ANN., KEN. PENAL CODE § 518.070 (1982).

12.

13.
14.
15.
16.

17.

Alabama's regulation provides: "Any person offering for sale or selling tickets at a price
greater than the original price and who is commonly known as a ticket scalper shall pay a
license tax of $100.00." ALA. CODE § 40-12-167.
Alabama's regulation carries no criminal penalty for violation which may be explained by the
fact that Alabama's judiciary has recognized scalping as a protected activity. See Estell v. City
of Birmingham, 286 So. 2d 872 (Ala. 1973); see notes 25-26 infra.
Several states carry much harsher penalties. For example, Rhode Island carries a $1,000 fine
for each offense. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-22-26 (1987). Connecticut labels a party's third offense
a felony. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-289 (West 1985).
See Tysoni Brothers v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
The two-prong constitutional test for a regulation to survive the public welfare test required
establishing that:
(1) the activity regulated is a threat to the general safety, morality or welfare
of society; and
(2) the statute, ordinance or regulation serves to reduce that threat
Kirtley v. State, 84 N.E. 2d 712 (Ind. 1949).
See Ex Parte Quarg, 84 P. 766 (Cal. 1906).
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as peanut vendors-were not also regulated." Other courts found that scalping
statutes simply regulated without advancing the public good.19
During the development era of the first half of this century, courts generally
rejected the notion of scalping regulation, but at the same time appeared able to
make distinctions between and among the various types of cases and statutes or
ordinances brought before them. For example, even the earliest cases recognized
the constitutionality of licensing requirements 2 and that trend of permitting
licensing seemed to hold up as the cases and regulation continued. 2' Overall,
however, the initial judicial decisions regarding scalping were unfavorable, particularly with those statutes prohibiting scalping altogether or those imposing
22
what appeared to be arbitrary regulation.
It has been primarily during the second half of the century that the courts
have staged considerable debates regarding the validity of antiscalping regulation;
for the most part, these regulations and ordinances have been upheld as a
legitimate exercise of the police power. 23 While some courts still reject scalping
convictions by narrowly applying the statutory language, 24 they seem to generally
support all forms of regulation.
More recent challenges to antiscalping regulations are generally based on, (1)
undue interference with a private property right, 25 (2) the deprivation of due
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

24.

25.

The case involved a Los Angeles city ordinance which the city defended on the grounds of
hazards created, but the public safety argument was lost when the hazards of other vendors
were pointed out. People v. Van Wong, 332 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1958).
See, e.g., Kirtley v. State, 84 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. 1949); Heller v. Cleveland, 25 Ohio Op. 106,
37 Ohio L. Abs. 545 (CP. Cuyahoga County 1942); People v. Steele, 83 N.C. 236 (N.C.
1907).
See, e.g., People v. Weller, 143 N.E. 205 (N.Y. 1924); In re Opinion of Justices, 143 N.E.
208 (Mass. 1924); People v. Newman 180 N.Y.S. 892 (N.Y. 1919).
See, e.g., Brody v. Marshall, 72 Pa. D. & C. 197 (C.P. Phila. County 1950) and KelleySullivan, Inc. v. Moss, 22 N.Y.S.2d 491, 110 Misc. 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1940).
See, e.g., In re Gilchrist, 181 N.Y.S. 245 (N.Y. 1920).
The shift in judicial attitudes is perhaps attributable to the U.S. Supreme Court's shift on
expansion of governmental authority to regulate, which required that the economic regulation
be "rational." See generally Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
With this shift from the two-part test, supra note 16, regulation simply had to be designed to
remedy a legitimate government concern.
For example, in State v. Spann, 623 S.W.2d 272 (Tenn. 1981), the Tennessee Supreme
Court, upheld a scalping statute in a case in which N.C.A.A. (National Collegiate Athletic
Association) basketball tournament tickets with a face value of $16 for a regional game and
$30 for the finals were sold by defendant Spann at prices of $75 for the regional tickets and
$250 for the finals. Spann was charged with a violation of the Tennessee code, § 31-4101,
which provides:
Scalping admissions tickets-Penalty. It is unlawful for any person to scalp an admission
ticket, pass or admission card to any theater, auditorium, stadium, dance hall, rink,
athletic field or any other place to which tickets, passes or admission cards are required
as a condition upon admittance thereto; or to offer or to attempt to scalp any such
admission ticket, pass or admission card.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-4101 (1984).
The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld Spann's conviction on the grounds that "a prohibition
on resale of tickets for a premium is a regulation which is entirely reasonable and within the
police power of General Assembly." 623 S.W.2d at 273.
For example, in People v. Johnson, 278 N.Y.S.2d 80, 52 Misc.2d 1087 (N.Y. Crim Ct. 1967),
a visiting foreigner sold her two $20 Metropolitan Opera tickets to an undercover officer for
$40 apiece when her estranged husband refused to attend the event with her. The court refused
to allow the conviction to stand on the grounds that, in the language of the statute, the woman
was not "in the business of reselling tickets."
In State v. Major, 253 S.E.2d 724 (Ga. 1979), the lower court declared illegal the Georgia
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process when regulation is so overbroad as to prohibit resale 21 or (3) violation
of the equal protection clause in cases where scalping prohibitions only apply to
certain facilities.7 The most recent case to strike down a scalping ordinance was
Estell v. Birmingham,2 in which the Alabama Supreme Court struck down an
ordinance that prohibited scalping of tickets to the annual University of AlabamaAuburn College football game on the basis that the ordinance was frivolous and
not based on a legitimate public interest. 29 Nonetheless, the case remains an
isolated one and distinguishable since the focus of the statute was upon the event
rather than on the generic public policy concerns regarding scalping.30 With the
exception of one case, 3 all of the judicial reviews of scalping regulations have
been the result of criminal convictions appealed by convicted scalpers.
At present, scalping prohibition and regulation are considered valid exercises
of police power on the bases that they ensure fair or full public access to events,
as well as prevent the nuisance of scalpers and possible concommitant harassment.

26.

27.

ticket scalping statute (GA. CODE ANN. § 96-602 (1985)), which provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, or offer for sale, any ticket of admission
or other evidence of the right of entry to any football game, basketball game, baseball
game, soccer game, hockey game, or golf tournament for a price in excess of the price
printed on the ticket: Provided, however, that a service charge, not to exceed $1, may
be charged when tickets or other evidences of the right of entry are sold by an authorized
ticket agent through places of established businesses licensed to do business by the
municipality of county, where applicable, in which such places of business are located.
GA. CODE ANN. § 96-602 (1985).
The trial court called the law "contrary to the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution
because it unduly interfered with the private property right of disposing of one's property at
a non-exorbitant, non-fraudulent, non-extortionate price set by him." 253 S.E.2d at 724.
In most regulations, resale is not totally prohibited but resale for a premium is prohibited and
hence the courts have reasoned that there is no deprivation of property and therefore no
violation of the due process clause. See Spann, supra note 23.
An additional observation of the courts is that these statutes serve to place "all sports fans
on an equal footing in the race to the ticket window." State v. Major, 253 S.E.2d at 733.
For example, the Portland, Oregon, code provides as follows:
Tickets to all events at municipally owned facilities shall have printed thereon the retail
price thereof. It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or offer for sale any such
ticket at a price greater than the retail price printed thereon, exclusive of fees or service
charges for sale of tickets not exceeding fifty cents per ticket at regular ticket outlets.
PORTLAND,

28.
29.

30.
31.

OR., CrrY CODE, § 14.36.070 (1988).

State v. Yonker, 585 P.2d 43 (Or. 1978), Yonker, convicted of scalping Portland Trailblazer
basketball tickets, contended that the statute violated the equal protection clause because the
prohibition on scalping applied only to municipally-owned facilities and not privately-owned
facilities. The court dismissed the argument on the grounds that there was a rational basis
for the distinction in treatment because Portland taxpayers had paid for construction and
supported operation of the facilities and the purpose of the ordinance was to ensure that
tickets were freely available to those taxpayers.
286 So.2d 872 (Ala. 1973).
The court noted:
We have carefully considered the opinion.., and are in agreement with the result that
the activity engaged in by the defendant, Estell, in reselling football tickets at a greater
price than that advertised by the proprietor or manager of the football game was not
so affected with a public interest as to be the subject of a price fixing regulation under
the police power of the City of Birmingham.
286 So.2d at 873.
There are some states with no judicial review as yet of their antiscalping ordinances, but Estell
is the last reported opinion in which an ordinance was declared unconstitutional.
In Gold v. DiCarlo, 235 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), Gold, a ticket broker, brought a class
action seeking to enjoin the New York Attorney General from enforcing a New York statute
which prohibited a resale profit in excess of $1.50 per ticket.
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In addition, the deprivation and use of scalping funds may be a concern,
considering the magnitude of revenues. 2 Regulation of scalping may be generated
by legitimate public welfare concerns,33 but it is unclear whether current statutes
adequately address those public concerns or whether such regulation represents
34
a rational approach given the economic motivation and constraints at issue.
II.

A.

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TICKET SCALPING: THE
MOTIVATIONS FOR SCALPERS AND PROMOTERS

Unique Aspects of Demand Related to Limited Seating

From a market perspective, ticket scalping is a consumer service. Demand and
supply forces interact and influence producers and consumers through the price
mechanism.
Here it is important to recognize that the price mechanism for concerts or
sporting events carries a further price component in addition to actual ticket
price. Relying upon microeconomic terminology, the relevant idea here is "full
price," where the full price of any commodity consists of its market-goods
component plus its time component. 5 This means that the price of a ticket to a
sporting event, rock concert or other such live experience is the actual dollar
amount paid for the ticket plus the opportunity cost of the time spent in acquiring
36

the ticket.

The critical question then becomes: Just why does the market-goods component
of the price to selected events become so strongly affected by ticket scalping?
The answer must begin with supply. Sporting events and rock concerts take place
32.

33.

34.
35.

36.

Though the small-time scalper seems to be the focus of most regulations, the scalping business
has been a breeding ground for major scams and securities fraud. For example, Walter Payton
was among 140 investors swindled out of a total of $3.2 million in a scalper's scheme that
involved borrowing money from investors to buy tickets and then paying them back with a
10-2007o profit in two months or less. The scalper involved operated this particular scheme in
Chicago, as well as another in Los Angeles. Bears Star Payton Burned, JET, May 14, 1984, at
50.
Another example is Bill Meisler, known as the most blatant, if not the largest-volume,
scalper in the U.S., because of his advertisement in Billboardmagazine which read: "MICHAEL
JACKSON, BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, PRINCE: Thanks for all you've done for me, from
America's Number 1 Ticket Broker, Bill Meisler, Corporation." Meisler was investigated by
the Ohio Department of Securities for his sale of notes to investors at prices between $500
and $20,000 with repayment at double the face value in eight weeks (the notes were used to
finance his ticket purchases to provide for his scalping base). See Nager, supra note 4, at 9.
Meisler has faced suits totaling $40 million, filed by investors who were not repaid in what
amounted to a Ponzi scheme based on ticket sales at double to ten times original prices.
However, repayment could not be made if the concert flow did not continue and the Prince
concert, supra, left Meisler with 2,000 unused tickets. Nager, supra note 4, at 9.
Indeed, given the Meisler experience, it might be more productive for states to limit the sources
of scalpers' funds-i.e., by prohibiting loans, investment sales and so forth-rather than resort
to securities fraud statutes for prosecution.
For example, the purchase and installation of an auto part may cost a car owner $20 in cash,
but the full price of the repair may be, say, $80, when the time component consisting of the
labor of installation is recognized. The same is true of the price of food purchased at the
grocery store and then prepared by the purchaser versus the cost of catered food. For a
complete discussion of time component costs, see Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of Time,
EcoN. J., Sept. 1965, at 1.
For example, in the passage opening this article, it was worth $12.50 (or maybe more) to the
Yankee fan with the crazy schedule not to have to wait in line or buy a ticket in advance.
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at facilities with a given capacity constraint at the time of the event.3 7 Only so
many people can fit into a given facility, and within any facility certain locations
are preferable to others. This space limitation presents the possibility for large
economic rents-that is, profits-for scalpers.
But whether the rents actually arise depends ultimately upon demand. For
scalpers to be successful, the event either must be a sell-out or intense demand
must exist for particular seats.3" This strong demand is the result of potential
ticket buyers' desire to be "part of the crowd." There is a singularity to being
at an event live. It is a "here and now" phenomenon in which the excitement
and chemistry among those attending can create intensely pleasurable memories
that last for considerable periods of time. This means that individuals are willing
to incur the full price of attending such events even when they are being broadcast
"free" on television or are available later on videotape.3 9
B. Reasons Underlying Scalping: The Surprising Creators of the Scalping
Market
The motivation behind scalping and the reason that ticket scalpers are able to
make significant monetary gains for certain events lies in the pricing approach
adopted by most event promoters. Typically, the market-goods prices of tickets
are determined well in advance of a scheduled event 4° and the tickets have the
preset prices printed upon them. 4' Then tickets are sold by the owners or
promoters through designated outlets several weeks or months prior to the event.
When these prices are set too low relative to what the market will bear, ticket
scalpers will enter the market to make monetary gains. Five possible explanations
arise as to why initial market-goods prices may be "too low" relative to consumer
demand up to or at the time of an event:
1.

Poor Market Analysis

Because of the "here and now" nature of live events, there is considerable
uncertainty beforehand regarding demand. One explanation for less-than-marketclearing prices is that price setters fail to undertake detailed market analysis.
Rather, prices are set by rule-of-thumb, e.g., charging what other promoters are
charging for similar events.

37.

38.

Naturally, supply can be increased over time either by building additional facilities, expanding
existing facilities or by holding more than one show in a given facility. The focus of this
article is on events that cannot be reproduced easily, if at all, and that are held in facilities
with given capacity constraints.
One scalper has noted: "It's like investin' [sic] in the stock market. All depends on how good

the game gonna be. Also the weather plays a big part. I eat tickets at least two times a week."
Mano, supra note 1, at 37.

39.
40.
41.

One executive of Ticketmaster, a distributing agency, noted, "You really don't understand this
business until you've stood in line for a heavy metal [rock] concert with kids with thumbtacks
in their foreheads." Id.
Often, rock concert organizers will seek bids from major potential promoters, who must in
turn have some idea of market demand before submitting their bids. Similarly, team owners
set ticket prices for the season in advance.
Some statutes specifically require that tickets to events have the prices printed on their face.
See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, para. 157.32 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); LA. RaV. STAT.

§ 4:1 (West 1973); MINN. STAT.
56:8-27 to 56:8-35 (West Supp. 1987).
ANN.

ANN.

§

609.805 (West 1987) and N.J.' STAT.

ANN.

§§
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While this may be true at times, it is difficult to believe that team owners or
event promoters consistently underestimate demand and fail to recognize that
they can capture large economic rents under certain conditions. Markets provide
information that promoters, as well as potential ticket scalpers, observe. It would
seem that experienced promoters are unlikely to make consistent, profit-reducing
mistakes.
2.

Post-Sale Shortages

A second explanation is that, while the initial price may have been determined
through detailed market analysis and was market-clearing at the time the tickets
first went on sale, the real shortage arose after the tickets were sold.
For example, a team may start a winning streak or a performer may receive
a special award or a large amount of publicity that intensifies demand as the
event approaches.4 2 Profit-maximizing owners or promoters would like to capture
the resulting economic rents, but with a policy of set ticket prices and advance
sales, they can only do so if they have remaining tickets and decide themselves
to scalp these tickets.
3.

Promoter-InsiderTrading

A third possibility is that the owners or promoters are indeed involved in ticket
scalping. For instance, they may offer nonchoice seats at "typical" prices, holding
choice seats back to see if an extremely strong demand for the event develops as
nonchoice tickets are sold first. If demand is strong, then the choice tickets are
scalped at market-clearing prices. The owners or promoters in this case can be
short-profit maximizers who have decided that detailed market analysis prior to
sales is costly or inappropriate. Of course, they may set initial prices too low
and forego some profits. Also, they run the risk of bad publicity if they are
caught scalping.
4.

Price Setting for the Long Run

A fourth explanation for less-than-market-clearing initial prices is that the price
setter is a long-run profit maximizer who is worried about "spoiling the market."
As indicated in the previous paragraph, scalping by owners or promoters is often
frowned upon by potential consumers, even if scalping is legal. This might create
adverse effects for promoters or team owners in the long run.
Thus, a highly visible rock concert promoter who has many events each year
in the same arena may not charge market-clearing prices for certain artists because
his less popular concerts would suffer due to the bad publicity associated with
perceived "ticket gouging." ' 43 Similarly, major sport associations like the National

42.

43.

For example, Prince's Academy Award nomination for his acting in the film Purple Rain
intensified the demand for tickets to his concert performances. Mano, supra note 1, at 37. Of
course, in some cases the converse might also hold true: interest in a concert may dwindle as
the time between initial sales and the actual event passes. In such a situation, scalpers must
unload their tickets quickly after initial sales. Id.
See, e.g., Bershad & Ensor, Ticket Scalping Legislation-A New Jersey Case Study, 9 SETON
HALL LEG. J. 81, at 99-101 (1985), for a review of attendees' complaints.
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Basketball Association (N.B.A.)" or Major League Baseball specify limits 45 on
the prices that home teams can charge for the N.B.A. finals or the World Series
so that the proper image of the league can be maintained-and so that future
sales are not hurt.
In such situations, ticket scalpers allow promoters or team owners to shift the
events skyrocket.
blame away from themselves as market-goods prices for certain
46
Irate consumers cannot complain to management as readily.
Long-run profit maximizing promoters and owners may also charge lower than
the market-clearing price for tickets if complementary revenues from the event
are sizable. For example, rock concerts generate compact disc, tape and record
sales for performing artists after an event, as well as concession sales during the
event. Major league sports teams generate substantial concession sales as well,
and they also receive television revenues. This means that the live gate becomes
a secondary source of revenue, and seemingly "too low" market-goods ticket
prices become more prevalent.
5.

The "Blue-Collar Fan"

Finally, less-than-market-clearing prices may be charged by owners or promoters
because they want to be "fair" to their customers, the fans. At times, this may
be tied to long-run profit maximization. While in the name of fairness baseball
teams fail to raise single game ticket prices as certain games take on special
importance during the season, they may also be considering the market value of
goodwill and complementary revenues. At other times, however, profits may
become secondary to fairness, as in the case of singer Bruce Springsteen, who
apparently wants his "true" fans to be able to attend his concerts; his great
success and wealth seem to have given him the ability to trade profits for other
objectives. 47 Of course, not many event promoters can afford to do this.
C.

The Effects of "Too Low" Prices on Ticket Scalpers

Whichever of the five previous explanations for "too low" market-goods ticket
prices to major events pertains, the result will be lengthy queues. Ticket scalpers,
taking advantage of demand, will attempt to purchase tickets at or near the set
market-goods price. They may employ diggers to stand in line to purchase large
blocks of tickets, and they may create nuisance effects. 48 If diggers do not

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

N.B.A. team owners have found other ways to control scalping. For example, during the 1987
N.B.A. playoffs, the Dallas Mavericks' owners refused to sell tickets to street people who they
identified as diggers, Beaumont (Tex.) Enterprise, April 22, 1987, at IA, col. 1.
The league's price limits may serve to intensify demand particularly because of the non-repeat
nature of the events and the limited capacity.
When management sells blocks of tickets in advance to selected brokers, as many major league
teams do, uncertainty is shifted along with the blame for scalping. The brokers respond to
immediate market conditions and make profits or suffer losses accordingly.
Springsteen's concert promoters have actively sought antiscalping enforcement to ensure that
fans can afford tickets. Lawmen Mobilize to Stop Springsteen Scalpers, Newark (N.J.) StarLedger, Aug. 3, 1985 at 1, col 1, and 9.
Nuisance effects include: harassing people in ticket lines (as diggers sometimes do in order to
either reach the head of the line or drive people out of the line, so that the digger can make
repeated purchases of tickets and thereby overcome limits on the number of tickets that one
buyer can take at one time), bothering people as they enter the event (either trying to get them
to buy or sell tickets), and counterfeiting of tickets.
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lengthen lines, causing "artificial" increases in demand, ' 9 and if nuisance effects
and other public costs such as scams and securities fraud remain minimal, then
laissez-faire economists defend scalpers as simply vendors who reduce the full
price of tickets for certain buyers, notably those busy individuals with high
opportunity costs of time. Standing in line is expensive for such individuals, so
they are willing to pay substantially more than the initial market-goods price for
selected events or seats. Economic rents in this case arise with the reallocation
of resources, but this is justifiable from a laissez-faire perspective since market
resources should be directed toward their highest return.
III.

KEY PROBLEMS SURROUNDING REGULATION

Based on these economic arguments, it becomes easier to distinguish among
various statutes in order to determine the flaws and possible detrimental effects
of scalping regulation. The following discussion summarizes the key regulatory
problems arising in today's environment.
A.

Difficulties of Enforcement

Scalping abounds in spite of significant numbers and types of regulation.
Although appellate opinions do give some indication of enforcement efforts, that
effort is necessarily limited because of costs, the difficulty inherent in "catching"
a transaction and the lack of uniformity in state laws and local ordinances. For
example, in a densely populated multistate area such as greater New York, there
will be residents of various states who wish to attend a given event in New York
City. Neighboring New Jersey prohibits scalping ° but New York permits it"' with
the result that scalpers simply cross the state line to avoid any problems with
violations. Some proposals-generally designed to alleviate the police manpower
problem-have been made to encourage private enforcement to allow purchasers
to get their tickets and then sue the scalper for the price difference and some
52
penalty.
B.

Differences in Constituency Interests

In the entire ticket sale-scalping scenario, there are a number of different
constituencies involved in the sale of tickets to high-demand, limited-seating
events. First, there are the promoters, who may or may not be in accord with
the performers in terms of ticket-pricing objectives. Next, there are the initial
ticket holders who originally plan to attend the event. Then there are potential
ticket holders, those who want to attend the live event but want a convenient,
non-time-consuming way to purchase tickets. In addition, there are those who
could not get tickets initially and are precluded from the event because of the

49.

50.
51.
52.

Whether diggers lengthen lines and cause artificial increases in demand is open to debate. If
diggers merely take the place of people who would have stood in line if diggers were not
allowed, then lines are not lengthened. On the other hand, diggers may increase demand, at
least momentarily, if they try to buy tickets in addition to those who do not substitute diggers'
time for their own in line.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:8-27 and 58:8-33 (West Supp. 1987).
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 25.03 and 25.05 (McKinney 1984).
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, para. 157.34 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (allowing suit to
recover the extra ticket cost, plus $100).
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higher prices resulting from scalping.53 Finally, there are the scalpers who may
or may not be associated with the promoter and who may or may not have
planned to attend the event originally. All of these parties have different interests,
constraints, motivations and expectations.
C.

Ticket Scalping As a Service

Ticket scalping causes a redistribution of tickets, typically toward those individuals with a high opportunity cost of time. 54 For those who do not want to
spend time waiting in line, scalping provides a service. Scalpers serve as middlemen
for those whose time is worth the ticket price differential created by the postinitial sales by scalpers. As implied.in the introduction to this article, such a
service makes many individuals happy. However, given human nature in rentseeking activities, nuisance effects and other public costs seem inevitable.
D.

Arbitrariness of Present Regulation

Some statutes try to prevent scalping by drawing a distinction between those
who purchase tickets in order to attend the event and those who purchase strictly
for resale. 55 Some statutes focus on the prohibition of the resale of tickets above
56
their initial market-goods price, or with only a small predetermined markup.
Some statutes prevent scalping where public facilities are involved, but permit
scalping where private facilities are used.5 7 Some statutes restrict scalping to
certain athletic events.5" This arbitrariness across state statutes raises questions of
equality before the law and illustrates the critical role of value judgments in
particular parts of the country in assessing motivations and behavior. Furthermore, differentiation in laws in metropolitan areas drawing event participants
from more than one state renders strong regulation ineffective, since scalpers will
simply conduct their business in states where such activity is unregulated or the
regulation is less stringent.5 9
E.

Significance of the Public Policy Issues

It is impossible to provide an adequate discussion of the flaws in current
regulation without considering the significant public policy issues surrounding it.
For example, some prohibitions may exist, as in Dallas, to prevent exploitation
of the homeless as diggers. 60 In other cases, the scalping industry has used drug
53.
54.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Promoters and others involved in event sponsorship often set event prices to reach the largest
number of a certain age or group. It may simply be a matter of pricing to establish goodwill.
Pyne, Talking Scalps, '80s Style, Phoenix (Ariz.) Gazette, Aug. 23, 1986, at 4, col. 1.
In some cases, the demand is so high, it is simply impossible for the potential ticket holders
to acquire the tickets. For example, in Bayreuth, Bavaria, there is an opera house that Richard
Wagner built. Tourists wait in line at the box office for hours hoping to intercept a ticket that
is returned. Scalping is illegal. To obtain tickets for the next summer's performances, applications must be made by November 15. Applications pour in from 73 countries. Generally,
after applying three years in a row, one is permitted to purchase two tickets. Kelley, The Suche
Line, NAT'L REV., Feb. 24, 1984, at 60-61.
See supra notes 6-11, and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 50-51.
See Pankay, supra note 4 (noting how often and how many homeless persons are employed
to stand in line for tickets to major events).
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dependency as a means of attracting and maintaining an on-call staff of diggers.6 1
There are also nuisance effects. Diggers may try to force their way to the front
of the line if the number of tickets per purchase is limited. Scalpers at the site
of the event may harass those going in. Unregulated scalping may encourage
ticket fraud, and the ability to resell tickets readily can lead to counterfeiting.
Finally, it is naive not to consider the tremendous revenues involved in the
activity. 62 This has led to fraud in the past; 63 furthermore, there may be serious
repercussions from such heavy flows of cash through informal economic organizations .64
IV.

THE EFFICIENCY OF SCALPING AND ALTERNATIVES FOR
PROFITMAKERS

Most regulation of scalping takes an overly broad approach to activities which,
from a microeconomic viewpoint, may result in an inefficient market. Existing
statutes fail to recognize or distinguish between scalping as a nuisance or as a
potentially illicit business activity-and scalping as a middleman function that
provides valuable services for a time-constrained group of potential ticket holders
wishing to attend a live event.
From a neoclassical microeconomic, or free-market, perspective, there are
clearly times where ticket scalping should be condoned rather than condemned,
as long as nuisance effects or illegal activities are not present. One obvious
situation is when the price setter has underestimated demand because of a lack
of detailed market analysis. Here, ticket scalping ensures that those most willing
to pay in fact attend the event.
Scalping may also be condoned when intense demand develops after initial
sales. Once again, scalping means that those most willing to pay the full price
are the ones to attend the event. Furthermore, since voluntary exchange benefits
both parties, those individuals who had every intention of attending, but then
sold their tickets because of attractive new offers, must be better off as well.
The situation in which promoters hold back choice seats to see if extremely
strong demand arises as the event approaches resembles that of manufacturers
who decide to hold some goods in inventory rather than selling all output at one
time. While society may frown upon promoter-"insider"-trading as mischievous or unethical, from an efficiency standpoint scalping directs scarce resources
toward those consumers most willing to pay, while allowing the promoter to
capture economic rents instead of scalpers.
61.

62.
63.
64.

Statutory vulnerability in this area results, particularly when so many high school and college
students are employed as diggers. For example, Meisler acquired 12,800 tickets to a 1984 Prince
concert, despite an eight-ticket per person limit, by hiring 1,600 high school and college students
to stand in line for him. Nager, supra note 4, at 9.
Meisler grossed $660,540 on the 1984 Prince Cincinnati Concert and had expenses of $298,000.
After repaying investors double their original investment, he had $120,000 of personal profit.
Id. at 10.
See supra notes 32-33.
Bill Meisler's downfall came when he bounced a $7.3 million payback check to investors.
During an interview he acknowledged he knew the check would bounce and offered the
following explanation: "It just got too big too fast. We were taking in $500,000 a week."
Meisler said his staff consisted of co-workers from his former busboy job and that they
comihitted bookkeeping errors like paying off notes two and three times and paying them off
early. Nager, supra note 4 at 11.
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Situations in which a promoter or team owner seeks to maximize long-run
profits, or wants to be "fair" to fans, must be interpreted more carefully in
65
terms of the overall desirability of scalping.
Long-run profit maximizers may tolerate scalping when they are not averse to
ticket redistribution in response to changing market conditions and they do not
want to incur the costs of changing their initial price strategy. This allows them
to avoid the blame for higher prices, and they are content as long as complementary revenues are maintained or increased. Tickets are again directed toward
those most willing to pay, thus promoting efficiency.
However, if expected revenues are not maintained or increased as scalping
takes place, long-run profit maximizers will want ticket scalpers driven from the
market. For example, having to pay extremely high ticket prices may discourage
those attending an event from concession purchases and other complementary
spending. This loss of expected revenues may cause fewer events to be produced
as time passes. The argument can be made that society suffers as a result.
There exist various means by which long-run profit maximizers might try to
eliminate scalping. Certainly, they may try to go through political channels,
lobbying for regulation, restriction, enforcement and so forth, but this imposes
nuisance costs on numerous individuals 66 as scalping rents are redirected. Alternatively, long-run profit maximizers may try to find market-oriented strategies
to deal with scalping, such as "Dutch auctions, ' 67 more closely controlled ticket
70
distribution, 6 changes in capacity 69 or higher economic rents through surcharges.
Neoclassical economists, seeing the efficiency of market-price allocations, much
prefer market-oriented strategies to political rent-seeking as long as there are not
65.
66.
67.

68.

69.

70.

See supra note 46.
For instance, Hal and the Yankee fan described in the opening passage.
One alternative to eliminate scalping for a major event in a fixed-capacity arena facing extremely
high demand (e.g., the World Series or Super Bowl) would be to start with what is perceived
as the highest possible market-goods ticket price the market will bear and sell tickets at the
distribution points for a short period (several days). Assuming some seats are still available,
the price is lowered somewhat and tickets are again sold at the distribution points for a short
period. This Dutch-like auction would continue until all seats were sold. Scalping could,
however, still arise in such a situation if demand somehow surged after the tickets were sold.
Thus, promoters adopting this approach should decide to sell tickets only shortly before the
event in question.
One ticket distribution method that guarantees no scalping is to have event participants
immediately enter the event after purchasing their tickets at the ticket window. Of course, this
means individuals wanting to attend an event are not guaranteed tickets unless the promoter
charges prices sufficiently high to eliminate lengthy queues.
A second method to minimize scalping would be to have individuals, as they buy tickets
in advance, show some form of valid identification-preferably a photograph-that is then
copied onto the ticket. Then, only that individual would be allowed to enter the event with
the ticket. For those who could not attend an event after purchasing tickets, resale could take
place at a controlled site, and each new buyer's identification could be copied over the old.
This article has focused on events that are not replicable and are held in facilities with given
capacity constraints. However, for some events-rock concerts, for example-promoters sometimes book a second show if the arena is available and demand is strong. The increased supply
of seats reduces scalpers' profits, especially if the alternative times are highly substitutable for
consumers, but there are naturally additional costs for the promoter.
For example, the University of Alabama imposed a $100-2500 surcharge per seat for season
tickets to Alabama home football games. The idea was to discourage scalper purchases of
large blocks of seats. In this case, the reaction of the public was generally unfavorable. So
such an approach might serve to cut sales, and may cost promoters money. N.C.A.A. NEws,
April 22, 1987, at 9.
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significant nuisance effects or illegal concommitants to an activity. Existing
antiscalping regulations appear overly broad in their attempts to eliminate public
policy concerns since their result is to eliminate not only nuisances, but valuable
service functions. If a state's primary concerns are the use of scalping funds, or
the regulation or licensing of scalping, then a prohibition on sales in the same
interests is a more appropriate approach. If the state's concern is harassment,
then time and place regulation would become more appropriate. Finally, if the
goal is preservation of the promoters' interests, whether it be profits, an appropriate audience or goodwill, then regulation to control ticket sales is best left to
their-that is, the promoters'-own devices.
CONCLUSION
While there are public policy interests involved in regulating scalping, it remains
unclear whether, first, its complete prohibition is necessary, second, existing
regulations address these policy interests or, third, due to existing inconsistencies
such regulation is even effective. Various constituencies are present, and regulation
of scalping requires addressing the needs of those sponsoring the event-from
city-owned facilities to free-market promoters-as well as those of the participants
in the events. Current regulation uniformly decries scalping per se, and defines
regulation from that perspective. But regulation, in this instance, should be
defined not from the perspective of the perpetrator but from that of the alleged
victim who, in the case of ticket scalping, may well be a beneficiary.

